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C. Wright Mills, Power and the Power Elites – A Reappraisal   
 
Introduction 
 
 
Mills can be conceived as a Socratic figure (Casanova, 1964; Barratt,2011a) seeking 
to caution American citizens of the 1940s and 1950s on the dangers of their era. As an 
engaged intellectual, Mills highlighted the existence of a new distribution of power 
associated with the elites of business, politics and the military in an era in which, as 
he saw it, Americans had become increasingly politically apathetic and inattentive to 
the forces that shaped their fate. Questions of power were the focus of Mills’s  
interests in his earliest work (Mills,1939). Reliant at this early stage on Mead 
(1934/1999) for his conception of the ways in which the inner life and conduct of the 
human subject was shaped through symbolic interplay with others, Mills viewed 
pragmatism as insufficiently sensitive to the institutional contexts and power 
dimensions of such processes. But it was during the years of the Second World War 
that Mills began to refine and develop his analysis. Seeking to refine an inchoate 
sense of change in American society, Mills’s explorations  of power suggest an array 
of intellectual influences. Borrowing from Max Weber, Mills conceived power as the 
realisation of the will even if this entails the resistance of others (Gerth and Mills, 
1967). Mills assumed any society to be divided into distinct, but interconnected 
institutional orders, raising the question of the distribution of power both within and 
between those orders. Sympathetic to Marxism, Mills nonetheless sought to de - 
privilege the role of the economic, insisting on the diversity of the ‘means of power’ 
and highlighting  the significance of bureaucratic, military and political forces. Mills’s 
analysis, as we will see, revealed both the concentration and coordination of power as 
distinctive trends in this era. Increasingly monopolistic in business organization, 
centralised in the processes of political decision making and with an expanding 
military, the fate of American citizens was increasingly determined by powerful and 
remote forces. And yet, as we will see, Mills never entirely abandoned the possibility 
of an enhanced form of democracy in the United States. 
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Today there are signs of a revival of interest in Mills’s analysis of power and elites in 
organization and management studies. Kerr and Robinson (2012), for example, praise 
the Power Elite (Mills, 1956/2009) as a classic, a considered engagement with the 
phenomena  of elites that unjustly became unfashionable in the 1960s. Increasingly, as 
we will highlight, efforts are being made to delineate the new elite formations of our 
own time, drawing inspiration from Mills (Murphy,2006; McLean et al, 2010; 
Bowman et al, 2013; Barratt, 2013; Godfrey et al, 2013; Zald et al, 2010). Mills, 
nevertheless, remains a contentious figure. For some as we will see, it would seem 
that we would have little to lose by forgetting Mills (Burawoy, 2008). Recent 
commentators have, we would suggest, shown little interest in the intellectual, social 
or political context of Mills’s analysis. We share with others a belief that a deeper 
sense of historical context is required when we borrow from the history of 
management studies (Booth and Rowlinson, 2006; Jacques,2006; Down,2001)). This 
paper explores the development of Mills’s thinking about the elites and dominant 
forces of his time in the period between the early 1940s and the mid 1950s. 
Foregrounding Mills’s various intellectual debts, we seek to emphasize the political 
imagination at work in Mills’s project as well as the more familiar sociological one 
(Mills, 1959/2000), as Mills seeks to clarify the ‘moral questions’ at stake in a 
particular state of affairs whilst also assessing ‘strategic points of intervention’ (Mills, 
1959/2000). Accordingly, we consider  Mills’s attempt to forge an ethico – political 
stance in rapidly changing conditions.  Reflecting critically on contemporary readings 
of Mills, we reflect further on what we might take from him today in our own time. 
 
The ‘sophisticated conservatives’ and the leaders of labour  
The first intimation of the configuration of power relations that Mills would later term 
the ‘power elite’ appeared in the early 1940s as he sought to refine an understanding 
of developments in the American political economy during these years (Mills, 
1942/1963). Mills’s response to the growing  importance of the State, business and 
the military should be understood in the context of what one writer has called one of 
the most ‘extraordinary cultural transfers of modern history’ (McClay, 1994, p.194): 
the arrival in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s of a significant number of 
German speaking intellectuals. If Mills’s neo Weberian understanding of power, 
social structure and stratification was shaped by his association with Hans Gerth 
(Gerth and Mills, 1948/ 1974), it would be another of the German émigré intellectuals 
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that would influence his understanding of a particular formation of power relations in 
American society. 
 
In Behemoth, Franz Neumann (1942/1966)  - differing from the orthodox Frankfurt 
school view of Germany as a system of state capitalism (Pollock, 1941) – presented 
the Nazi regime as a collaboration of four political blocs: the Nazi party, the state 
bureaucracy, the military and heavy industry. Given that each bloc possessed its own 
system of rule formation and enforcement, the regime should be considered a ‘non 
State’ (Neumann, 1942, p.xiii) without effective coordination, lacking in any 
framework of public law and arbitrary in its operation. Yet notwithstanding their 
institutional autonomy, a commonality of interests and aims gave the blocs cohesion 
in their operation. War had brought prestige to the military, glory to the Nazis and 
high profits to business, as the productive power of monopolistic German business 
became a pillar of the Third Reich and as business leaders enjoyed the spoils of 
conquest. The blocs ultimately coalesced in pursuit of a common aim: a continual 
preparation for and maintenance of imperialist war (Neumann, 1942, p.174).    
Militarisation, as Mills emphasized in his review (Mills, 1942/ 1963), had provided a 
solution  to intractable problems: the economic slump and unemployment of the 
1930s. The conclusion that Mills drew from his reading of Neumann was that rather 
than assuming a relation of absolute difference between the United States and Nazi 
Germany, Americans might consider certain resemblances between the two societies. 
Neumann’s account of the German system of interlocking elites captured a broader 
drift in international capitalism – suggesting not only important aspects of the 
American political economy during war time but the harsh outline of a possible future 
(Mills,1942/1963, p.177).  
    
Mills (1948/2001) returned to the same theme in his early study of the American 
labour movement and its leaders. Capturing the predicament of the leaders of labour 
required an attention to actors in an institutional and social setting, the forces that 
shaped their activity and influenced their space for manoeuvre: not only the 
bargaining ploys and practices of business leaders or the expectations of union 
members, but the mass public and the educated ‘publics’ –  groupings of politically 
alert actors reflecting different shades of political opinion actively involved in 
discussing and organising in the public domain. Mills presented a picture of a 
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generally conservative and defensive labour leadership, guided by long standing 
traditions of business unionism, a membership with largely pecuniary interests and a 
mass public generally hostile to the leaders. Crucially, political debate was 
increasingly informed by those  forces that Mills now termed the ‘sophisticated 
conservatives’: an alliance of elite forces that threatened the interests of labour – the 
true agents of decision and the most dangerous political forces of the time, as he saw 
it.  
 
Mills’s analysis reflected changes in the American political economy that had  begun 
in the 1930s. An alliance of sections of business and the political classes had 
developed to facilitate the administration of the  New Deal (Lichtenstein,1982). The 
leaders of labour joined this alliance in a subordinate role assisting  in the formulation 
of codes of fair competition under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. The 
war years saw business and labour collaborating in the administration. During 1941, 
Sidney Hillman of the CIO played a key role in the Office of Production 
Management, led by William Knudsen of General Motors, planning the mobilisation 
of resources. After January 1942, responsibility for the war time planning of 
production lay with the War Production Board (WPB), controlled by prominent 
business leaders, providing crucial support to a military strategy based heavily on 
supremacy in air power (Milward,1977). But labour representatives took up positions 
in the tripartite National War Labour Board (NWLB), setting wage levels and 
arbitrating in labour management disputes and in the administration of the system of 
price control and rationing (Lichtenstein,1982). 
 
In the aftermath of war, as Mills saw it, labour unions were vulnerable to the political 
manoeuvres of the sophisticated conservatives, an alliance of sections of business, the 
political classes  and the military that favoured the maintenance of  collaborative 
relations with labour. The conservatives sought to promote a narrow collective 
bargaining agenda, offering union recognition and economic concessions in return for 
the active cooperation of their leaders in reinforcing management aims and 
suppressing labour rank and file dissent. Conservatives of this type sought to disguise 
their ambition to stabilise a particular and unequal distribution of power. The future, 
according to Mills, held out the prospect of further dangers. The cooperation of labour 
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was now sought as a necessary element in fresh plans for the American economy: the 
building of a corporate ‘garrison state’ (Mills,1948/2001, p.233).   
 
Mills’s central problem with the United States in this era related to a state of affairs 
that undermined democracy, involving an unhealthy integration of such powerful 
political, business and military forces excluding the wider public and holding out the 
prospect of a dangerous war economy in peace time. At the same time, the creative 
intelligence of American citizens was constrained by this configuration of power 
relations. In this connection, Mills characterised the leaders of American labour as 
largely devoid of political will and imagination. Yet at this stage, the hope of an 
alternative to the circumstances that he outlined had not been entirely extinguished. 
Throughout this study, there are intimations of the potential of the rank and file and 
elements of the leadership of the CIO – particularly the Auto Workers Union. In part, 
Mills’s optimism, reflected the influence of the political circles in which he moved at 
the time (Wald, 1987). Mills evidently lacked the Marxist sectarian tendencies of his 
associates among those he termed the radical left. But he shared their interest in 
building a non communist left. Also shared with the radical Trotskyist left was a 
belief in the tendencies of capitalism to catastrophic  economic crisis and a faith in the 
political potential of the working class. With the impending crisis Mills envisaged the 
prospect of class polarisation and a radicalisation of the labour rank and file. ‘Slump’, 
he argued, would make ‘the rank and file show its muscle’ (Mills, 1948/2001, p.67). 
The sophisticated conservatives, with their strategies for the political economy, might 
well win out in these crisis conditions. Yet labour too, Mills believed, strengthened by 
its radical membership and by  independent intellectuals of the kind employed by the 
UAW,  also stood some chance of prevailing.  
 
For the benefit of a political situation that Mills believed, to a degree at least, to be 
still open to influence he elaborated a possible alternative future for the United States. 
In the 1930s, Mills praised those citizens who possessed ‘the imagination and 
intelligence to formulate their own codes….the courage and stamina to live their own 
lives in spite of social pressure’ (Mills,2000,p.34).  Now he wrote of the need to 
induce  a capacity for ‘initiative and self reliance’ (Mills,1948/2001,p.264) in the 
union membership. The development of a ‘vision’ for labour implied the constitution 
of an organization capable of seeing ‘with a hundred eyes….. elaborating what might 
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be done about it with a hundred minds and stating ….all the probable consequences of 
each possible move’ (Mills,1948/2001,p.284). Mills imagined the possibility that 
politics would become so much part of the way of life of the American worker, of 
daily work and social routine ‘that political alertness would be part of his human 
being’ (Mills, 1948/2001,p.269).  
 
Though Mills believed John Dewey to be guilty of nostalgia for his belief that 
democracy should begin ‘at home’ in the local community and for his insensitivity to 
modern divisions of class and power (Mills,1966), as others have argued 
(Tilman,1984), there are  echoes of Dewey’s political ideals in Mills’s formulations at 
this time. Effective freedom required the ability to contribute actively and intelligently 
to the collective direction of all social institutions which affected personal existence – 
including the work place. Both Mills and Dewey associated democracy with the 
enlargement of human character. The self was enhanced by the capacity to determine 
purpose and desire in all the relations of life. In this respect both Mills and Dewey 
gave a distinctive democratic inflection to the Emersonian ideal of the self reliant 
American (West, 1989) able to compose the aggregate of a character. And ultimately 
all shared a debt to the ancient ethical ideals that Michel Foucault explored in his final 
books (Foucault, 1985,1986). The theme of self care or self mastery permeated ancient 
thought from the Platonic dialogues through to the major texts of the late Stoics but 
through his reading of the early Plato and Montaigne it was revived by Emerson 
(1836/2000). An ‘ethical life’ implied a practical process of self constitution, decision 
making and action. And for Mills and Dewey, it was under democratic conditions, in 
an extended and participatory sense, that such an ideal had the potential to flourish.  
 
Other resemblances between Mills and Dewey -  linked to a shared dependence on 
particular resources of political discourse - are evident. Both were ultimately 
committed to republican and Jeffersonian ideals (Rahe, 1993). Jefferson, following 
Machiavelli and the Roman republicans, assumed that an active and informed 
citizenry  was the best defence of a democratic polity against inherent tendencies to 
corruption and excess on the part of those who governed. Dewey and Mills concurred, 
whilst adding that only under participatory conditions could human creative and 
critical powers find expression.  
 
7 
 
Similarly, in developing a particular ideal of workplace democracy, Mills like Dewey 
in the 1920s,  looked to British socialism:  to the Guild Socialism of G. D. H. Cole 
(1920).  The basic ideals of the guild system of  democracy in the shop, works and 
industry were borrowed from Cole. The agency of the unions as a democratic force 
was required not only in securing control of the shop and works but at the level of the 
governance of  industry and the planning and coordination of the national economy. 
Nationalisation, nonetheless, remained a vital objective. By such means the public 
interest in the running of industry could be satisfied. The agency of the State – 
implying a new party of the left -  remained vital as a means of achieving a proper 
balance between prices, wages and the surpluses of individual enterprises. The aim 
was to guard against the inherent dangers of a producer led form of democracy. And 
like Cole, Mills imagined a role for the State in enabling the organisation of 
consumers as a political force (Mills,1948/2001, p.263).  
 
Freedom, for both Mills and Dewey, depended on an array of supporting and enabling 
conditions – including, especially, the material security of workers and citizens. 
Freedom was not therefore an abstract principle, but an effective power to act. And in 
this respect much of the detail of Mills’s  thinking was shaped by the left Keynesians 
of the American labour movement (Lichtenstein, 2001). Walter Reuther – the new 
leader of the UAW after 1946 -  was clearly of significance for Mills. Reuther had 
emerged as leader of the rank and file resistance to the divisive and opaque incentive 
schemes imposed by the National War Labour Board during the war years 
(Lichtenstein,1995). For his socialism, Reuther appears to have owed a debt to the 
socialism of Eugene Debs and the ideal of the cooperative commonwealth of labour 
(Boyle,1995; Lichtenstein,1995). Reuther‘s subsequent career can be viewed as a 
series of attempts to interpret and give substance to the ideal of ‘industrial democracy’ 
(Lichtenstein,1995). In  1940 as Director of the UAW’s  General Motors division, 
Reuther offered an alternative plan for aviation production in preparation for war, 
arguing for a new board of control for the industry to include representatives of 
labour, government  and management. Later, in 1945, Reuther elaborated on the 
possibilities for the new post war political economy, arguing for planning mechanisms 
at national and industry level. Diverse interests -  labour, business, government  and 
agriculture  - should play a part in coordinating both prices and production. Such 
8 
 
ideals can be said to have inspired the dispute at General Motors in 1945/6 as Reuther 
pursued the ambition of establishing public control of the American economy.  
 
But Mills’s view of Reuther was ultimately equivocal. Notwithstanding the radicalism 
of  his proposed changes to the political economy, Reuther’s democracy would not 
have altered  authority relations at the point of production. There was a danger, as 
Mills saw it, that Reuther would fall prey to the reactionary forces of the sophisticated 
conservatives, an inclination to human engineering (Mills,1948/2001) that could lead 
the Union astray. What Mills appears to have appreciated most was Reuther’s part in 
bringing a number of significant socialist ‘intellectuals’ into the Union after his 
election. Inspiring the more innovative elements in Reuther’s thought and political 
strategy, many  of the intellectuals had been students at the union funded Brookwood 
College (Lichtenstein,1995) and possessed a background in the Socialist party, in the 
fruitful period  of open debate before factional infighting with ultra leftist elements 
had caused the party’s decline (Heale,1990). The Union Research Director, Nat 
Weinburg,  exemplifying the best in the UAW leadership as Mills saw it, spoke of the 
end of business unionism  and a new agenda for advancing the welfare of the 
community as a whole (Weinburg cited in Mills, 2001, p. 259). The left Keynesians of 
the UAW, especially Donald Montgomery of the Union’s Consumer Office 
(Lichtenstein,1995), saw income redistribution as the key means for promoting 
aggregate demand, warding off the possibility of a return to the economic conditions 
of the 1930s. Then there were the innovations in Union democracy associated with the 
Education department of Victor Reuther: diverse attempts to foster an informed and 
vibrant activism in the Union (Reuther,1976). 
 
Mills - as others have emphasized (Geary, 2009) -  drew inspiration from the UAW in 
the post war years. To be sure it was never a question of imitation, more of sources 
that inspired the political imagination. Positions that Mills ultimately adopted in the 
study of labour (Mills,1948/2001, pp. 258 – 259), the possibility for the unions to 
engage in formulating their own plans for industry, were derived from his association 
with the intellectuals of the UAW. Certain macro economic, redistributive policies -   
a sharply graduated income tax, reduced indirect taxes, higher wages and the control 
of prices - were no more than outlined and, reflecting his republican convictions, 
Mills hoped to see a public that would engage in continuous evaluation of these 
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policies. Yet writing in the later 1940s (Mills,1948/2001) Mills was still encouraged 
by new thinking among elements of labour.  
 
The Power Elite 
By the final years of the 1940s Mills’s disillusionment with labour had grown. Their 
moment, as he saw, it had passed. The problem lay largely in the conservative 
leadership, increasingly fearful of changing political conditions with the growing 
influence of the political right and seeking to protect not only bargaining rights but 
their own newly won status. The labour leadership now focused overwhelmingly on 
traditional ‘business union’ issues: wages and job security with few signs of resistance 
in the rank and file. Mills noted the leaders of labour seeking to enhance their position 
in the circles of the ‘power elite’ (Mills, 1954/1963), taking up positions not only in 
institutions of the federal government but the international agencies set up to 
administer the Marshall plan. Involvement at the apex of government served to 
enhance the prestige of the ‘self made’ new men of power (Mills,1954/1963, p.101). 
Mills’s subsequent investigations would leave little doubt as to the marginal status of 
the labour leaders among the elites. And there were wider social changes at stake. 
Mills now – like many others of the left at this time -   increasingly emphasised the  
conservatism of the American citizenry.  
 
Mills (1956/1999) considered the processes by which the elites were formed, the 
solidarity and commonalities of value and interest among them. He wrote of the 
growth  and concentration of the means of power at the disposal of those that 
occupied positions of ‘command’ in business, the military and the polity. Such means 
had been greatly expanded by changes over the course of the twentieth century: the 
emergence of the large scale enterprise, the expansion of the military after 1914 and 
the growth of central government, associated especially with the period after the New 
Deal. And the expansion of the powers of those who led these organisations had been 
accompanied by a pattern of coordination or integration among them. An ‘inner circle 
of political outsiders’ now occupied key positions in the administration. Composed of 
‘members and agents of the corporate rich and the high  military in an often uneasy 
alliance with selected policy makers’ (Mills, 1956/1999, p.156), Mills argued that a 
clique of ‘outsiders’ had effectively taken over the executive post of administrative 
command. The consequences for citizens were profound.     
10 
 
 
Mills’s development of his earlier assessment of the sophisticated conservatives 
should be understood in the context of changing political conditions of the time. The 
prestige of the elites of business and the military had been greatly enhanced by their 
part in the war effort. The international context, the years of the ‘cold war’ and 
especially the Korean war, served to consolidate the role of these same forces in the 
administration. As Mills judged it, a series of related developments signalled that the 
‘garrison state’, which he had anticipated in the 1940s, had now come into being. 
Representatives of business and the military, with the sanction of politicians, had 
effectively captured key positions in the executive branch of government. The 
executive had become the principal  site of political decision making, with the 
legislature as well as the judicial branch relegated to a lower level (Mills, 1999, p.4). 
Numerous decisions were effectively excluded from legislative or public debate. The 
military, in particular, now dominated the formation of policy in the fields of 
international diplomacy and foreign affairs, as well as playing a significant part in the 
fashioning of economic policy. A ‘military metaphysic’ (Mills, 1956/1999, p.198) 
now informed the policy of the State. The permanent expansion of  military capability 
was presented as a means to national security, but served an array of other aims: 
enhancing the prestige of the military, warding off a return to ‘economic slump’ and 
promoting the relentless drive for corporate profitability. 
 
To those who imagined United States as a balanced society, with a freedom of 
association that allowed the formation of diverse, competing interest groups and a 
separation of powers between the elements of the State, Mills responded with the 
image of a social order now dominated by the loosely interconnected cliques of 
business and the military. Such a regime was at once unaccountable and secretive in 
its mode of operation. This state of affairs served at once to stifle democracy, political 
argument and creativity. Americans now knew what it meant to live in a ‘military 
neighbourhood open to catastrophic attack’ (Mills,1956/1999, p. 183).  They now 
lived under a state of emergency without foreseeable end (Mills, 1956/1999, p.184). 
As the United States expanded its capacity to exterminate human life on a global scale 
through the development and deployment of thermonuclear weapons, its leaders now 
exposed the world to their ‘crackpot definition of reality’ ( Mills,1956/1999, p.361). 
Mills’s critique acquired an urgent, even breathless, character.  
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Mills’s elite was not a ruling class in the way that Marxists imagined. The polity 
exhibited its own institutional specificity, even if outsiders, associated with the 
military and business, now occupied central positions in the administration. Mills 
highlighted the regime of character formation and development through which the 
elites passed. A ‘preparatory’ schooling and higher education made possible by access 
to substantial wealth encouraged similar values and manners among the business elite. 
Comparable codes were promoted in the disciplinary regimes of West Point and 
Annapolis. In important respects, the members of the elite were alike: American by 
birth, predominantly from the cities of the eastern states. A familiarity among them 
had been born not only through joint experience in the administration – in the 
planning mechanisms associated with war production or the agencies that emerged 
with the New Deal – but also through common involvement in trade associations or 
recreational activities. Though not without their differences, all were ultimately united 
in pursuit of common interests: the system of private property and the aggrandizement 
of the military. Mills thus explored the ties of solidarity and cultural homogeneity that 
made the power elite a social entity. For the elites of America at least, it seemed that 
the concept of ‘class consciousness’ had relevance (Mills, 1956/1999, p.283). 
 
Yet these developments took place largely behind the back of the American citizenry. 
Mills’s concept of the ‘main drift’ suggested the conventional wisdom of the time. 
Diverse forces were working to promote a particular liberal ‘version of reality’, a 
benign image of the forces of power promoting the national interest. The military was 
now actively involved in a public relations campaign to redefine the reality of 
international relations in a way that justified the expansion of military capabilities. A 
combination of public relations and the use of the doctrine of ‘official secrets’ 
undermined reasoned political debate, enabling the activities of the elites. At the same 
time, Mills returned to the conditions of the mass society first considered in the earlier 
White Collar (1951/2001). Borrowing from the aestheticians among the émigré 
intellectuals of the Frankfurt school (McClay, 1994), Mills argued that an atomised, 
passive and compliant citizenry had developed in the United States, encouraged by 
the practices of mass mediation. To this could be added the effects of alienating work 
regimes and the expansion and bureaucratisation of political and voluntary 
organisations. The masses were now moved mainly by culture rather than by reason 
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and in such conditions, the possibility of independent thought and popular political 
action was seriously diminished. The United States had found its own path to the 
mass society.  
 
Daniel Geary (2009) characterises Mills’s investigation of ‘the power elite’  as a work 
of disillusioned radicalism: Mills’s critique implied a rejection of American society, 
whilst offering no way out from the predicament he identifed. And yet Mills’s 
position is an ambiguous one; there are certainly moments in which he appears to find 
cause for optimism in the ‘private tensions’ (Mills,1956/1999, p.314) and ‘inarticulate 
resentments’ (ibid) of the American citizenry. The moment of wide ranging 
democratisation led by the vanguard elements of the labour movement had clearly 
passed. Yet Mills, in moments of optimism, still imagined the possibility of a new and 
reinvigorated democracy. Hope lay in the possibility that  a fearful and anxious 
citizenry might be transformed into one more politically alert, willing to submit the 
dominant forces of the era  - now misusing power -  to critical scrutiny and 
responsible influence. Public opinion, Mills argued, existed where people ‘who are 
not in the government of a country claim the right to express political opinions freely 
and publicly and the right these opinions should influence and determine the policies, 
personnel and actions of the government’ (Mills, 1956/2009, p.309). Once again, the 
parallels with Dewey (1927) are evident in the  Jeffersonian ideal of a politically alert 
and active citizenry acting as a sure defence of freedom. In both Mills and Dewey a 
version of American political history -  first systematised by such writers as Daniel 
Webster, Jared Sparks and Alexis de Tocqeville in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century (see Gustafson, 2011) - was assumed. Though modern American 
republicanism built on Roman precedent and possessed its own distinctive 
institutions, on this interpretation what was most characteristic of American political 
life was its dispersed scenes of public debate and deliberation. Countless voluntary, 
self governing and deliberative bodies pursued diverse charitable, social and political 
goals. 
 
Mills was fully aware of the fictional nature of this narrative (Mills, 1956/1999, 
p.303). And modern conditions – including the emergence of large scale political 
institutions and the diverse forms of expert knowledge on which political authorities 
relied – set the limits within change might be possible. The aim was to explore the 
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possibility of republican ideals at a different historical moment and to intimate certain 
essential preconditions for the formation of public opinion. Associations of citizens 
free of state interference, settings in which social actors could practice deliberation 
with their fellows and, by their combination, experience an enhanced sense of their 
own political agency, provided one such condition. Such institutions would be 
positioned between ‘the family and the small community’ on the one hand and ‘the 
effective units of the power elite’ on the other (Mills, 1956/1999, p.309). 
   
Mills envisaged a variety of social and institutional changes if his ideal of creative 
democracy was to be attained. He offered no definitive programme of reform but rather 
intimated a set of principles that might be taken up and elaborated by others to enable a 
community of publics to thrive. In part this was a matter of the inculcation of habits in 
the citizenry. To work with others for shared ends presupposed that citizens engage in a  
labour of moral and political reflection and evaluation. Accordingly Mills wrote of the 
need for adult education as a practice of ‘self clarification in the ancient sense’ (Mills, 
1956/1999, p.318). Supplementing vocational learning, a liberal education would include 
the development of the skills of controversy with one’s self ‘which we call thinking’ and 
‘with others that we call debate’ (Mills,1956/1999, p.318). Evoking the challenge of 
what he would later call the ‘sociological imagination’ (Mills, 1959/2000), it was the 
task of a liberal education to  help individuals to clarify the social sources of their 
inarticulate personal tensions and grievances by locating them in the social conditions of 
their existence. Education would thus develop the dispositions of character, both 
intellectual and moral capacities, which would fit men and women for a new democratic 
social order. And Mills also looked forward to a type of journalism that would enable the 
individual to transcend his narrow milieu and ‘clarify its private meaning’ (Mills, 
1956/1999, p.315). Such forces and agents would help to call to account the elites of this 
era in business and the military. 
 
But a new and enhanced democracy also suggested the need for a more responsible form 
of government. Displacing the artfulness of the public relations campaign and the 
manipulation of the doctrine of official secrets, Mills looked forward to a new era based 
on free dialogue between the governed and those who govern. And responsible politics 
implied changes in the administration. Mills revealed himself as no simple anti 
bureaucrat, but an enemy of the ‘pseudo -  bureaucracy’ dominated by  the ‘political 
outsiders’ of the military and business (Mills, 1956/1999, p.235). The inference was that 
14 
 
Civil Service reform might comprise one of the objectives of the movement of citizens 
that Mills desired. The power elite had been made possible in part by the absence of a 
genuinely independent bureaucracy (Mills, 1956/1999, p. 276). The United States had 
still to break decisively with the system of ‘spoils’ popularized under the Presidency of 
Andrew Jackson whereby, subject to the approval of Senate, appointments to the Civil 
Service were under the control of the President (Mosher, 1982). As early as the 1870s, 
reformers in the United States had challenged the inefficiency and corrupt nature of a 
system that rewarded political supporters, looking to the British reforms of the 1850s 
(Barratt, 2009) for an example of a fully independent and impartial bureaucracy. For 
Mills, the Pendleton reforms of 1883 which introduced elements of the British system -  
the ideal of an independent civil service, appointment on merit and a Civil Service 
Commission - contained a fatal flaw. The President retained powers to classify and 
declassify positions in the offices of government as Civil Service appointments. In the 
years of the ‘New Deal’ political appointments at the highest levels of government and 
in the newly established agencies grew substantially as Roosevelt sought enhanced 
creativity and commitment in those charged with administering policy (Rourke, 1992). 
After 1953 Eisenhower responded to such ‘politicization’ in the offices of the federal 
government by increasing the level of patronage. For Mills, what the United States 
required was an independent bureaucracy effectively above party political pressure and 
with a genuine career civil service. The dominance of ‘outsiders’ in the offices of 
government not only demoralized the lower levels of the Civil Service, damaged 
recruitment and impaired the knowledge and capability available to the federal 
government. Mills’s defence of bureaucracy as a distinctive life order – characterized by 
virtues of integrity, impartiality and neutrality enjoying a close affinity with democratic 
ends – recalled Weber (1994). The impartial bureaucracy of an independent civil service 
was a praiseworthy thing.    
 
Mills and power today    
For Michael Burawoy (2008), notwithstanding a profession of admiration, it would 
seem that we have little to gain by remembering Mills today. There is a politically 
debilitating fatalism and pessimism at the heart of Mills’s thesis. The idea of a ‘power 
elite’ was quickly assimilated into the American collective consciousness (Burawoy, 
2008, p.369) but became an anachronism. Yet this assessment appears excessively 
dismissive. Elsewhere, as we have noted, there is evidence of Mills inspiring fresh 
insights into the emerging elite formations of our own era. Examples here include 
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accounts of the elites of the British financial sector and the lobbying networks and 
rationalising discourses which helped to secure control of the regulatory agenda in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s (Bowman et al, 2013). In Britain, the use of business 
advisers or the reconfiguration of the offices of government in accordance with the 
norms of the unitary board of the public limited company afford spaces for 
representatives of a select business elite to enter the offices of government and play a 
critical role in the fashioning of policy (Barratt, 2013). Recent administrations in the 
United States have enhanced the powers of the executive branch of government and 
the business elite remains dominant in the executive. Members of these business and 
political elites, Aronowitz (2012) argues, emerge from a similar social milieu to that 
which Mills described. Others (Godfrey et al, 2013)  have highlighted the intimate 
connections and associations between the state in Britain and the United States and 
the private military and security industry, now at the centre of attempts to privatise 
warfare. If the ‘permanent war economy’ has not disappeared (Aronowitz, 2012), with 
expenditure on the military amounting to 4.3% of GDP in the final year of the Bush 
administration, the private military and security industry becomes a major beneficiary 
of this investment. Business elites expand their influence in the offices of government 
as neo – liberal governments, seeking economy and efficiency in the delivery of 
services to the world stage, turn to outsourcing and partnership arrangements. Others, 
directly evoking Mills (Murphy, 2006), write of a new global governance regime and 
its mechanisms of formation. The ‘power elite’ exported to the world stage is 
understood to comprise the top bureaucracies of transnational governance institutions, 
multinational corporation executives and the leaders of national governments   
 
We would suggest a number of commonalities in this post Millsian genre of elite 
theorising. First, there is a desire to stay close to changing formations of power, to 
move beyond the familiar themes of the processes of corporate ascent, socialisation 
and inter organisational advancement  - the ‘corporate interlocks’ – associated with 
Mills’s earlier followers (eg Useem, 1984). These analyses suggest not a unified 
power elite but a variety of elite formations: multidimensional and evanescent in 
nature. Particular attention is given to the aims and ambitions of the elites as well as 
well as the tactics and social practices by which they are pursued. And, more 
generally, it is assumed that Mills requires critical appraisal, with the aim of this re 
theorising being to reform and revise rather than to reject.  
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Mills is inclined at times, as Burawoy (2008) rightly argues, to talk down to the 
publics that he seeks to interpolate. Edward Thompson (1963) long ago highlighted 
the tension in Mills’s project between the disposition of the expert and the craftsmen. 
At his most certain and dogmatic, Mills imagined himself as an agent of truth, 
enlightening others in the realities of their situation, penetrating false appearance. The 
expert was ultimately a custodian of the ‘interests’ of others, revealing the sources of 
their ‘alienation’. Surpassing Mills should mean going beyond the dogmatic reasoning 
to which he is inclined. It should also involve an acknowledgment that ‘interests’ are 
only available to actors by virtue of a practice of discursive formulation (Hindess, 
1982).   
 
Mills and those who follow an interest in the formation of corporate elite interlocks  
are vulnerable to Dennis Wrong’s concern that they give insufficient attention to how 
the elites exercise their power (Wrong, 1956, p.279). Mills exemplifies what Barry 
Hindess (1996) terms the ‘capacity outcome’ conception of power: power is assumed 
to be a capacity or ‘possession’ of particular agents -  in Mills’s case mainly by virtue 
of  their positioning in bureaucratic hierarchies and networks. The danger is of 
circular reasoning (Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips, 2006), with greater power being 
assumed to prevail over lesser power and power relationships assumed in advance of 
the analysis of any particular field of human action. How elites compete and vie for 
position is obscured in this analysis (Reed, 2012). This perspective tends to 
discourage the examination of the forms of knowledge available to and deployed by 
elites. Mills had little to say of the think tanks and exclusive political discussion 
groups that informed the thinking of the elites in his era, just as they do in our own 
(Domhoff, 2006). In his earliest published work Mills (1939)  argued for the detailed 
study of ‘vocabularies of motive’ and their social and historical conditions of 
possibility. A research agenda, derived from a reading of classical pragmatism, was 
proposed but never fully exploited.  
 
Circular in logic, the perspective on which Mills relied tends to discourage the 
examination of tactics and instruments of power and their deployment in concrete 
settings. In this regard, Daniel Bell (1963, p.52) was correct to argue that Mills gave 
little consideration to the norms, values and, especially, the practices of ‘leadership’ 
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that would give the concept of power greater substance. The centralized power of the 
business and military elites was seemingly limitless: without scope or medium. And 
Mills ultimately obscures the dependence of the ‘summit’ - the elites -  on a whole 
complex of power relations and practices beyond the ‘strategic command posts’ at 
lower levels, the minor expertise of the manager or of the consultant and the work of 
translation and interpretation that they bring to bear in their implementation of elite 
decisions.  
 
Mills has little sense of the relational quality of power (Clegg and Haugard, 2009). 
Thus the meaning of the mass media for its audiences  required further investigation. 
He is vulnerable to the charge, as Norman Denzin (1990) argues, of neglecting the 
detail of the experiences of the ‘little people’ in his major texts. And as others argue 
(Geary, 2009) this same inclination was apparent in the neglect of important counter 
tendencies in this era, developments with the potential to destabilise the dominant 
forces which he  documented. Mills had little to say of those neglected under the New 
Deal (Hayden,2006): those who still experienced poverty and racial oppression. 
Neglectful of the politics of race and gender, the notion that Mills might help us to 
explore ‘power in all its dimensions’ (Aronowitz, 2012)  appears in need of 
qualification. And, more generally, Mills appears an unreliable guide as a theorist of 
experience of the experience of relations of force. 
 
As we have seen,  accompanying Mills’s cynical appraisal of the elites is a different 
sensibility: a sense of the future as open and unfinished and the outline of an 
alternative political vision. How might Mills be of relevance to critics today in this 
respect? His Weberian defence of bureaucracy resonates with positions endorsed by 
contemporary critics in organisation and management studies (du Gay, 2000; 
Armbruster and Gebert, 2002; Barratt, 2009). Traces of republicanism, with some 
resemblance to Mills, can also be discerned (eg Barratt, 2009). Yet perhaps, beyond 
Mills’s particular ethico – political preferences, there is a broader issue at stake. After 
Mills, the clarification of values and politics becomes a personal task and a challenge, 
involving an on - going process of reflection and the active cultivation of an identity. 
‘Moral stakes’ are not fixed or given. We have noted that Mills’s assessment of the 
costs of the power elite alters over time: the democratic deficit and the possibility of 
war intimated in the study of the labour leaders (Mills, 1948/ 2001) gave way to a 
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more urgent, even fearful response as the political moment changes 
(Mills,1956/1999). The practical meaning of each new set of circumstances required 
an effort of fresh thinking about implications and dangers. And attention was also 
required to changing political possibilities and what was possible under different 
economic, social and political conditions. As the moment of labour passes, Mills finds 
hope in the possibility of an enhanced form of democracy and especially an informed 
and autonomous citizenry, holding political actors to account, maintaining effective 
and responsible leadership.  
 
With Mills, the cultivation of an ethico – political position requires an alertness to the 
passing moment and a work of composition. Like Dewey, Mills is an inheritor of an 
array of ethical and political discourses that he adapts selectively and critically. 
Jeffersonian republicanism, elements borrowed from the history of socialist thought 
and practice, elements of pagan thought and the practical experience and 
achievements of the political movements of his era were reshaped and adapted in a 
distinctive and imaginative way. The example of Mills suggests that, without 
nostalgic yearning, we might further explore historical experience for suppressed and 
unrealised political possibilities and how they might be made relevant to the 
conditions of our own time. Cultivating an ethico -  political identity in the style of 
Mills, demands that we should always be prepared to learn from others, to have our 
perspective widened or radically altered through listening. It suggests, in particular, 
that we might continue the exploration of the organisational and ‘leadership’ practices 
and ideals of the social movements of our own era that others have recently begun 
(Sutherland et al, 2013). Perhaps too, after Mills, we might begin to rethink our uses 
of the concept of power. Mills, as we have seen, was not the libertarian enemy of 
power that some of his liberal critics imagined (Parsons, 1957). Power was not simply 
the power of one agent ‘over’ another, as is commonly assumed in organisational and 
management studies. Mills reminds us that democratic virtues and capabilities are not 
natural but must be learnt. Mills, in this guise, would encourage us to think more 
about the enabling or productive nature of power in our attempts to imagine 
alternatives – the human capacities, resources and conditions that are required when, 
for example, we imagine workplaces of self rule and self care (Townley,1994; 
Barratt,2008). 
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The personal labour of fashioning an ethico -  political stance is thus an unending one. 
There are contrasts here, it would seem, with positions adopted by contemporary 
critics as they debate the political implications of their perspectives. Some, in our 
view rightly, have challenged the value of the fractious internal disputes and scholarly 
polemics associated with the field of critical organisation and management studies 
(Parker, 2002; Gray, 2005; Barratt, 2008). But the argument - as we see it more 
questionably -  can be taken a stage further (Gray, 2005). Critics, it is claimed, should 
acknowledge their common connection to the political left and seek to advance the 
reputation and standing of critical scholarship within the business school for 
collective benefit. A bridgehead in the business school could assist critics to speak 
authoritatively in the public domain, exposing managerial excesses and abuses, 
including – perhaps most especially - those of the ‘global managerial elites’ 
(Grey,2005). The risk however, is of stifling serious discussion of alternatives  - a 
debate that might put the very meaning of a ‘left’ response in question. After our 
reading of Mills, to work with others for shared ends presupposes that we pursue a 
hard labour of personal political reflection and evaluation.  
 
But there there are tensions in Mills’s arguments.  For Emerson, James and Dewey  -  
in the style of Socrates -   an attitude of doubt and an openness to change was to be 
maintained in matters of belief and value. Discriminating judgements, for both James 
and Dewey, presupposed a grasp of both the conditions and consequences of a set of 
convictions. One required a capacity for self criticism and a willingness to put matters 
to the test of practical experience and open debate. Mills, in principle at least, 
appeared to take a similar view (Mills, 1959/2000). In practice, however, the position 
is less clear.  
 
Mills (2000) sought to defend himself from the critics of his own era. He caricatured 
criticism of his thesis from the left (eg Sweezy, 1956) as bounded by an inadequate – 
but doubtless reassuring – faith  in Marxist orthodoxy. To  liberals (eg Dahl, 1958) he 
responded by arguing that he had aimed only to capture a ‘drift’ or tendency in 
American society. The liberals judged him by the standard of a conspiracy theory, 
misreading his central thesis. The elites were bound together in more subtle ways, by 
cultural homogeneity and ties of solidarity born of a variety of social conditions. 
Liberals imagined themselves as neutral commentators on social developments 
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without realising the value commitments inherent in their interventions. They were 
unable to recognise the decisive shift towards the permanently militarized state and 
the diverse powers that sustained this development. 
 
But relevant experience of Mills’s favoured ideals were ignored in the study of labour.  
He failed to address the experiments in guild socialism in both Britain and the United 
States (Matthews,1971). Mills failed to ‘think against’ his own positions and to 
explore dangers and risks. A host of relevant criticism was ignored. There were those 
critics of the guilds, of its limited forms of worker participation (Flexner,1923), critics 
who raised the problem of how the powerful or those with an urge to the mastery of 
others might be restrained (Russell, 1918). Mills forgot Nietzsche’s (1968) reflections 
on the dangers of assuming a human will to good. Mills, at times, was vulnerable to 
the charge of failing to recognise that the capacities of citizens must depend on social 
and cultural conditions of training and practice (Parsons,1957). At various points, the 
political imagination was inclined to excess. As we have seen there are moments in 
the study of labour, when Mills inclined to images of crisis and overcoming to be led 
by the forces of the working class, a conception borrowed from the radical left but 
ultimately recalling biblical sources. This was the position that he would later dismiss 
as that of the labour metaphysician (Mills, 1962). 
 
 
Concluding Comment 
Small power, middle levels of power…………………We have offered here a critical 
appreciation of Mills’s examination of power and the power elites of his era. We have 
commented also  on his continuing attempt to theorise a way out from the 
predicament he described. In the light of an array of plausible criticism, his 
fundamental conception of power, his tendency to obscure the voices of marginal 
subjects, the treatment of actual and possible struggles, Mills -  we have suggested  - 
is not an unproblematic example. Ultimately perhaps it is at a more general level, in 
respect of his critical sensibility that Mills is at his most persuasive. As we have seen, 
Mills works critically with the dowry of concepts that he inherited in forging a 
perspective on the power dimensions of his era. The elaboration of an ethico – 
political position similarly required an ongoing work of reflection and self criticism, a 
willingness to be moved by events and by others. In the style of Mills, the critic is one 
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who seeks to impose a style or taste on his or her  values and politics. Critics of 
management today allude to the need to avoid lapsing into intellectual dogma (Grey 
and Willmott, 2005) and Mills can serve as an instructive example. But there is a 
similar need, we would suggest, in respect of the ethico –political stance of the 
management critic, to avoid unthinking orthodoxy. Mills, we have suggested here, 
avoided such tendencies. It is at such moments that he is most deeply persuasive and 
perhaps inspiring to us today. 
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